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mastered early, then switch on your grammar-acquisition de-
vice . We have some preliminary evidence that children recog-
nize echo questions as having distinct discourse requirements at 
least by age 3 (Takahashi 1991), but it is hard to imagine this as 
instantaneous. H ence the scavenger hunt solution faces some 
difficulties. 
The claim that syntax acquisition is instantaneous "once the 
lexical items and sentence structures" are fixed, hides most of 
what is interesting about acquisition. Crain means that the 
principles of syntax (subjacency, structure dependence, binding 
principles, the ECP) can only come into play once the basic 
phrase structure and lexical items are known. So any disobe-
dience of those principles should be attributed to a failure of 
either lexical or phrase structure knowledge, and that is the 
traditional solution (Matthei 1981; Otsu 1981). The problem 
arises in assessing obedience to principles and grammatical 
structures independently. 
Everyone adm its that elicited production is a marvelous 
technique for increasing the frequency of rare sentences. But 
production often leaves us uncertain about the grammar gener-
ating the sentences in question. For instance, I have recently 
made the argument that children's first adjunct questions may 
be generated in the topic position in front of the sentence, 
masquerading as Wh-questions in the spec of CP (de Villier 
1990). Researchers on German are deeply divided about the 
position into which German-speaking children place their 
verbs, even though they obey the "V2" rule of German (Meisel 
& Muller 1990; Weissenborn 1990). 
In short, the manifestation of an appropriate surface form by a 
child does not guarantee that the grammar behind it is the same 
as an adult's . In particular, production studies do not tell us 
anything about excluded interpretations, so they must be sup-
plemented both with interpretation experiments and, even 
more ideally, a comprehensive sample of the child's spon-
taneous speech at that same point in time. In practice, then, the 
criterion, "when all the lexical items and sentence structures are 
in place," is the cornerstone of all empirical work in acquisition. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the errors that occur in 
interpretation are not just artifacts of poor experimental controls 
in every case. Consider the error we find that 4-year-olds make 
in interpre ting a complex question such as: When did he say 
who he painted? Here, these children answer the medial, 
indirect, "who." Several controls have convinced us that this is 
not a simple parsing mistake, of the trivial kind ("answer the last 
Wh-word you hear" (de Villiers & Roeper 1991). Instead, it 
appears to reflect an option found in some other languages, in 
which the first question word is a scope marker for the second 
(McDaniel 1989). The fact is that children's grammars often 
deviate from adult grammars in extremely interesting ways, yet 
they may still be constrained by universal grammar - that is, 
somewhere, the child's grammar is right! The real stimulus for 
theory and understanding of the process of acquisition is not 
children's success, but the ir deviations from the adult state. 
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In this commentary we consider three issues. First, we suggest 
that Crain's definition of innateness is not biologically plausible. 
Second, we show how the criteria he uses as hallmarks of 
innateness can have alternative explanations . Finally, we rein-
terpret his research findings on grounds that do not involve 
innatist explanations. 
What Is Innateness? Most students of language acquisition, 
including Crain, seem to equate innate with "unlearned," 
although few state this as an explicit definition (Oyama 1990). 
Commentary / Crain: Language learning 
Contrasting innateness and learning shows a confusion between 
different levels of biological organization. Learning presumably 
takes place in the realm of cognition and action, in which the 
brain participates through auditory sensation and speech motor 
processes to respond to, and to form, words and sentences. The 
genes, on the other hand, construct proteins within the nuclei of 
cells; they do not process speech input or regulate output. A 
fundam ental assumption of innatist theories of language is that 
the structure of the brain and its related sensory and effector 
systems is just a bigger, better version of the genetic code. 
Another reason why "unlearned" is not a legitimate definition 
of innate is that there are many types of environmental effects 
other than learning that alter developmental trajectories. In-
deed, the genetic material cannot survive and reproduce out-
side its intracellular environment. The environment of the 
genes is physical , electrical, and chemical; learning is unrelated 
to it. The phenotype that results from those genes - as we know 
from an increasing number of studies in developmental biology, 
embryology, and teratology - is determined by a complex 
network of parallel and serial processes interacting in the intra-
and extracellular environment. The structure of the brain is not 
a direct cellular instantiation of the genetic code, but rather the 
result of many dynamic processes including cell growth, migra-
tion, and synaptic generation and degeneration . 
Problems with the "negatille ellidence" argument. Crain's 
claim that language is innate rests on the argument that the child 
lacks the necessary negative evidence about the grammaticality 
of utterances, that is , parental speech to children is inadequate 
to allow learning to occur. In this view the neuromotor system 
supporting language reflects the genetic component, whereas 
parental speech is considered to be the primary form of experi-
ence. We have already suggested that the neuromotor system is 
not innate, but rather the result of a developmental process, 
beginning at conception, that involves gene-environment trans-
actions . To assume that parental speech is the only form of input 
to the neuromotor system supporting language is to ignore 
completely the large body of work on the prelinguistic develop-
ment of speech and gesture. What emerges from that work 
(Dent 1990; Fogel & Thelen 1987) is that the patterning of social 
interaction has a sequential structure and a pragmatic ecology 
that constrains the timing, sequence, and semantics of speech in 
nonlinguistic ways. 
For example, intonational information in child-directed 
speech can provide important cues to meaning and structure. 
Such "non linguistic" information might provide negative evi-
dence of the sort that is critical to Crain's argument. As we show, 
some such information may be contemporaneously available in 
Crain's experimental tasks: Children could succeed in Crain's 
experiments without an abstract grammar of the sort that Crain 
suggests. Because of space limitation , we discuss only some of 
the experiments . 
Alternatille explanations of Crain's data. Consider Crain's 
complex protocol for subject extraction . As part of the task 
statement, the experimenter says to the child : "One of them 
gets to take a walk, one gets to take a nap." It is likely that in each 
of the "gets to" phrases in the task statement, both "gets" and 
"to" are clearly enunciated and distinguishable. Since the con-
struction "gets to" is exactly parallel to the expected "wants to" 
(and not "wanna") response from the child, the child need not 
previously acquire this construction, but may simply copy the 
intonation contour, inserting the new word. 
Similarly, the "protocols for rightward contraction" seem 
likely to be influenced by intonational and pausal differences. In 
ordinary speech, the re are differences in "what that is" between 
(1) and (2): 
(1) Ask Ratty what that is doing up there. 
(2) Ask Ratty if he knows what that is up there. 
The " is" is more emphatic and distinctive in (2) than in (1). This 
is exactly the kind of information available to the child that could 
allow repetition without contraction in (2). 
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1991) 144 617 
Commentary/Crain: Language learning 
Next, consider the "1 clause crossover task." In (3), as the last-
mentioned characters in the story, Robocop and Batman might 
most naturally be the referents for "they." 
(3) I know who they scratched. Bert and Huckleberry Hound. 
Because Bert and Huckleberry Hound follow scratched, the 
child can readily connect these as the objects of scratching, 
particularly since "they" is already determined. Presumably the 
child has some minimal knowledge of the subject-verb-object 
structure of English. The child's knowledge of reflexive pro-
nouns might also provide a correct interpretation. Suppose a 
child already has some experience with sentences involving the 
reflexive, such as (4), and therefore can rejeet (3) as reflexive. 
(4) I know who scratched themselves. Bert and Huckleberry 
Hound. 
In other tasks, there are semantic or pragmatic facts available 
to the child so that there is no need to appeal to innate syntactic 
structures. Crain argues that multiple modifiers have a hier-
archical rather than a flat structure as a result of innate syntactic 
rules. But this hierarchical structure seems grounded in seman-
tics and based on the child's experience with objects. Some 
features of objects arc relatively intrinsic (Garner 1974); in 
Crain's task, these are shape and stripedness/plainness. Other 
features, such as relative position in an array, are extrinsic. The 
intrinsic-extrinsic dimension provides hierarchical structure. 
The child's knowledge of the intrinsic properties of the objects 
in the task is presumably established (or heightened) by experi-
ence with the objects, exactly in accord with Crain's procedure. 
Similarly, one could argue as to the semantic/pragmatic 
origins of relativization in the child's experience with given and 
new information. Consider (5), uttered by a child who did not 
yet produce relative constructions: 
(5) It's a fishing pole, and you fish with it. (from High et aI., 
unpublished) 
Does the hierarchical relation expressed here emerge from an 
innate relative structure not yet realized syntactically, or has the 
child simply expressed a relationship acquired from prior expe-
rience, a relationship grounded in pragmatics rather than in 
syntax? 
